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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS WHETHER PARK 
CITY'S ACTIONS WERE IN EXCESS OF ITS AUTHORITY OR CONTRARY TO 
LAW. 
The standard of review applicable to this matter is 
dictated by whether the questions at issue are factual or legal 
in nature. Park City argues that its decision to approve the 
project must stand unless found arbitrary and capricious. The 
arbitrary and capricious review standard applies in the context 
of factual disputes. The present dispute involves the 
interpretation of the Park City Land Management Code, a 
question of law. In this context, questions such as whether 
Park City's approval was arbitrary or capricious are not 
pertinent.1 
In Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents,2 the Utah Supreme 
Court expressly adopted the "legal basis" review standard. In 
identifying the proper focus of appellate review of an 
administrative agency decision, the Court sanctioned reversal 
in cases where the administrative agency "has in some way acted 
contrary to law or in excess of its authority."3 
The cases cited by Park City in support of its contention 
that arbitrary and capricious is the only review standard 
available to this Court all involve situations where fact-based 
agency decisions are challenged. In Cottonwood Heights v. 
Board of Commissioners,A the County Commission issued a permit 
to construct a 2 00-unit apartment complex. Plaintiff contended 
that the approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious 
for two reasons. First, the Commission had denied a similar 
application from a different applicant five months earlier, and 
no substantial change of circumstances had occurred. Second, 
xArguably, Park City's actions are arbitrary and 
capricious since they are contrary to Code which authorizes the 
actions. This need not be decided because, as argued, the 
Court has another basis for reversing the actions. 
2595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979). 
3Jd. at 1302. 
A593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979). 
2 
the Commission failed to gather all pertinent information from 
all possible sources. 
Unlike the present matter, there was no question in 
Cottonwood Heights concerning whether the agency's actions were 
contrary to any ordinance or statute. The questions were 
factual in nature: (1) whether there was a substantial change 
in circumstances; and (2) whether all pertinent information had 
been gathered. Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious 
review standard was appropriate. 
Likewise, in Davis County v. Clearfield City,5 Plaintiff 
contended that Clearfield City's denial of a permit was without 
substantial basis in fact. The trial court agreed and found 
that the city's actions were arbitrary and capricious. On 
review, this Court also found that the reasons supporting the 
city's denial were arbitrary and capricious because they were 
without sufficient factual basis. 
Finally, Park City cites Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment,6 
for the proposition that the trial court may not substitute its 
judgment for a Board of Adjustment. Again, the questions were 
essentially factual. The Board of Adjustment found that 
Xanthos failed to show special circumstances warranting a 
5758 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988). 
6685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
3 
variance. The trial court found that the circumstances shown 
by Xanthos were sufficient as a matter of public policy and, 
thereby, substituted its judgment for that of the Board. The 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that the trial court improperly 
disregarded the Board's finding of fact and substituted its 
own. 
Thurlow does not dispute Park City's contention that 
arbitrary and capricious is the correct standard for review of 
an agency's fact-based findings. Agency interpretations of 
law, however, are subject to a more exacting standard. As the 
Utah Supreme Court indicated in Petty v. Board of Regents, the 
appropriate inquiry is whether the agency action is contrary 
to law or in excess of its authority. 
POINT II: PARK CITY'S APPROVAL OF THE PROJECT IS NOT 
CONDITIONED ON THE DEVELOPER MEETING THE SIXTY PERCENT OPEN 
SPACE REQUIREMENT. 
Park City acknowledges that the project, as approved, does 
not meet the open space requirement found at §10.9 (h) (3) of the 
Land Management Code.7 In response to Thurlow!s argument that 
the project approval should be reversed on this basis, Park 
City makes two arguments. First, Park City states that "the 
7See Brief of Appellant at A-2 for a copy of the relevant 
section. 
4 
approval by Park City is conditional on the final site plans 
submitted and the actual project meeting the sixty percent open 
space requirement."8 The minutes from the Park City Planning 
Commission meeting at which the project was approved show three 
conditions to the approval, none of which mention the open 
space requirement: 
(1) City engineer approval of all 
grading, drainage, and utility 
plans; 
(2) Approval by the city landscape 
architect of a conceptual landscape 
plan, and posting of security to 
guarantee installation of all 
public improvements and 
landscaping; 
(3) Fire marshall approval of the 
project.9 
In connection with this argument, Park City states "that 
the final plans have not been submitted as of yet to Park 
City."10 Whether the plans approved by Park City as a part of 
the overall project approval are final is not disclosed in the 
record. Park City raises this issue for the first time in its 
brief. Resolution of the issue is not necessary, however, 
because Park City approved the project in its present 
Brief of Respondent at 9. 
9Minutes of the June 22, 1988, Park City Planning 
Commission meeting at 12 (R. 60). 
10Brief of Respondent at 10. 
5 
configuration, a configuration that fails to meet the statutory 
open space requirement. Whether the developer will cure the 
deficiency at some later date is irrelevant. Park City's 
approval of the project is contrary to the requirements of the 
Land Management Code and, therefore, the approval must be 
reversed. 
POINT III: THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PROJECT MEETS THE OPEN 
SPACE REQUIREMENTS WAS PROPERLY RAISED AND PUT AT ISSUE. 
Park City argues that Thurlow failed to properly allege 
and put at issue the open space question.11 Admittedly, the 
question is not raised in Thurlow's Amended Complaint. It was 
briefed and argued to the trial court, however, and Park City 
has no basis for objection to its consideration on appeal. 
Thurlow first raised the issue in support of her Motion 
for Summary Judgment.12 Park City addressed the issue in its 
opposing memorandum.13 Park City argued that the project meets 
11Brief of Respondent at 3 and 9. 
12Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
4 (R. 37). 
13Memorandum in Support of Park City's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 3, 4, and 7 (R. 130, 131, and 134). 
6 
the open space requirements and, in support, supplied copies 
of a portion of the project's plans.14 
Thurlow again addressed the issue in her reply 
memorandum,15 then argued the point at the hearing on the cross-
motions for summary judgment.16 At no time did Park City object 
to the trial court's consideration of the issue. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides that when 
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the implied 
consent of the parties, the issues are treated as if they were 
raised in the pleadings. Amendment to the pleadings may be 
allowed to raise these issues, but failure to amend does not 
affect the result. 
Although Thurlow did not raise the open space issue in her 
initial pleading, she did raise it in the pleadings supporting 
her Motion for Summary Judgment. The issue was tried without 
objection and, therefore, with the implied consent of the 
parties. Pursuant to Rule 15, Park City may not now object to 
its consideration. 
^R. 146. 
15Memorandum in Reply to Park City's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Park City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 
2-3 (R. 148-149). 
16Reporter's transcript at 2-3. 
7 
POINT IV: PARK CITY'S ARGUMENT REGARDING "CLUSTERING" DOES 
NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER FOURPLEXES ARE A PROHIBITED 
USE. 
Park City argues at length in support of its contention 
that the Land Management Code allows "clustering" of 
structures. The contention itself is correct, but it does 
nothing to refute the fact that the project contains 
fourplexes, a prohibited use in the HR-1 zone. 
Park City!s justification for approving the project with 
fourplexes is that the Code's prohibition does not apply when 
the fourplex is part of a MPD. Apparently, the argument is 
that since MPD's are allowed as a conditional use in the HR-1 
zone, and fourplexes may be incorporated into a MPD, fourplexes 
must be permitted in the HR-1 zone.17 
The problem with this reasoning is that it ignores and is 
contrary to the express language of the Land Management Code. 
Section 10.9 of the Code states that a use, such as a fourplex, 
is permitted as a part of a MPD only if it is permitted in the 
zoning district in which the MPD is located.18 
Furthermore, the Land Management Code contemplates the 
very situation advocated by Park City. The land use table that 
17Brief of Respondent at 11. 
18Section 10.9 is quoted and discussed at more length in 
the Brief of Appellant at 13. 
8 
describes the permitted, conditional, and prohibited uses in 
each zone contains the notation f,c1|f in every block where the 
Code allows a use "within the zone only as a part of a [MPD], 
and not as an isolated land use."19 In other words, if 
fourplexes were allowed in the HR-1 zone as a part of a MPD, 
as Park City argues, the Notation lfclfl would appear in the 
block corresponding to fourplexes in the HR-1 zone. Because 
the notation does not appear in the block20, the use is 
prohibited and Park City's approval of the project is contrary 
to the Code. 
POINT V: APPLICATION OP THE UNIT EQUIVALENT FORMULA TO 
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PERMITTED UNITS INCREASES DENSITY. 
Section 10.9(b) of the Land Management Code provides as 
follows: 
Maximum Density Requirements. The 
requirements of Section 7 (Use Tables) 
regarding maximum densities shall apply to 
all [MPD's] . . . .21 
The Use Tables set the maximum density allowed in the HR-1 zone 
at one single family dwelling unit on each 1,875 square feet 
19Reference Note 1 to the Land Use Tables, copies of which 
are attached to the Brief of Appellant at A-4 and A-5. (R. 
158, 159.) 
20Id. 
21Brief of Respondent at A-l (R. 109) . 
9 
of vacant land.22 The project contains 28,875 square feet of 
vacant land. Accordingly, the maximum number of units 
authorized by the Code is 15.4.23 
Despite this maximum, Park City approved the project with 
3 6 units, or one on every 802 square feet of vacant land. 
Presumably, Park City approved this increase in density under 
the only exception to maximum density provided in the Code, 
found at §10.9(b): 
Maximum Density Requirements. The 
requirements of Section 7 (Use Tables) 
regarding maximum densities shall apply to 
all [MPDfs] except that the approving 
agency may increase the number of permitted 
units to the maximum bonus levels found in 
this chapter if it finds that the site plan 
contains areas allocated for usable open 
space in a common park area as authorized 
in this section, or that an increase in 
density is warranted by the design and 
amenities incorporated in the master 
planned development site plan, and the 
needs of the residents for usable open 
space can be met.24 
The §10.9(b) exception under which Park City was entitled to 
"increase the number of permitted units11 is conditioned on one 
of two findings being made by the reviewing agency. 
22Brief of Appellant at A-8, 9 (R. Ill, 102). 
2328,875 total square feet divided by 1,875 square feet per 
unit equals 15.4 units. 
24Brief of Appellant at A-l (R. 109). 
In response to Thurlow's position that Park City failed 
to make the required findings, Park City argued that no 
increase in density was allowed.25 Park City acknowledges, 
however, that the project is approved with more than one unit 
for every 1,875 square feet. Therefore, Park City's position 
is untenable. An increase in the number of permitted units was 
allowed and, as previously noted, the required findings were 
not made. 
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Thurlow's 
initial brief, the trial court's judgment should be reversed 
and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Thurlow. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~2sO day of July, 1989. 
r L^ 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
25Brief of Respondent at 13-14. 
11 
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